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We report experimental studies on the effect of the depolarizing quantum channel on weak-pulse
BB84 and SARG04 quantum cryptography. The experimental results show that, in real world
conditions in which channel depolarization cannot be ignored, BB84 should perform better than
SARG04.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.79.Sz
In quantum cryptography, the goal is to establish
shared secret keys between two communicating parties,
Alice and Bob [1]. One of the key components of the
original BB84 quantum cryptography protocol is the
single-photon source, but the lack of efficient single-
photon sources resulted experimental implementations
with weak pulses of light [2, 3]. The weak pulse imple-
mentations are practical but is susceptible to the photon
number splitting (PNS) attack [3, 4]. It, nevertheless,
has been shown that secure keys can be extracted from
the weak pulse implementations of the BB84 protocol if
certain conditions are met [5, 6].
There also exist quantum cryptography protocols
which are inherently more secure against the PNS attack
when implemented with weak pulses. One is the decoy
state method [7] and the other is the SARG04 protocol
[8]. The decoy state method, while very robust against
the PNS attack, requires additional physical resources
which could introduce further vulnerabilities to the sys-
tem [9–11]. The SARG04 protocol, on the other hand,
offers more robustness against the PNS attack than the
BB84 protocol implemented with weak pulses, while us-
ing the same hardware as that of the BB84 protocol [12].
One important problem in real-world quantum cryp-
tography systems is the systems’ behaviors under the
presence of disturbances in the quantum channel (e.g.,
the depolarization effect, the phase error, damping, etc.)
connecting Alice and Bob. In particular, it is of impor-
tance to compare the performances for the BB84 and
SARG04 quantum cryptography systems as they differ
only in the classical key sifting procedures [13–15]. In this
paper, we investigate experimentally how the depolariza-
tion effect in the quantum channel affects the secure key
generation performances for the weak-pulse BB84 and
SARG04 quantum cryptography systems.
In the weak-pulse implementation of the BB84 and the
SARG04 quantum cryptography protocols, the qubit |Ψ〉
is encoded in the polarization state of a weak pulse of
light and is sent to Bob via a free-space or a fiber quan-
tum channel. The effect of depolarization in the quantum
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channel on the qubit |Ψ〉 can be written as ε[|Ψ〉] and is
given by[13]
ε[|Ψ〉] = F |Ψ〉〈Ψ|+D|Ψ⊥〉〈Ψ⊥|, (1)
where |Ψ⊥〉 is the state orthogonal to |Ψ〉, F is the fidelity
of the quantum channel, andD quantifies the disturbance
in the quantum channel. The values F and D depend on
the quantum channel visibility V as F = (1 + V )/2 and
D = (1− V )/2, respectively [13]. Note that F +D = 1.
Let us now consider how the channel depolarization
will affect the quantum bit error rate (QBER, Q), which
is the ratio of the number of error bits in the sifted key to
the total number of sifted keys. In the BB84 protocol, a
sifted key bit is generated when Alice and Bob happen to
choose the same basis and, thus, the error bit in the sifted
key is dependent on the disturbance D in the quantum
channel. Since the probabilities for generating the error
bit and the correct bit in the BB84 protocol are given as
pe = D and pc = F , respectively, QBER can be written
as[13],
QBB84 =
pe
pc + pe
=
D
F +D
=
1− V
2
. (2)
In the SARG04 protocol, the situation is a bit dif-
ferent. Consider, for example, Alice sends |V 〉 and an-
nounces publicly S0 ≡ {|V 〉, |45
◦〉}. On Bob’s side, out
of four possible outcomes, only the | − 45◦〉 outcome is a
conclusive one [8]. When depolarization in the quantum
channel is considered, ε[|V 〉] = F |V 〉〈V | + D|H〉〈H | =
1
2
| + 45◦〉〈+45◦| + 1
2
| − 45◦〉〈−45◦| + F−D
2
|45◦〉〈−45◦| +
F−D
2
|−45◦〉〈45◦|. Thus, the probability of the correct bit
is pc = 1/2 and is independent of the channel visibility
V . The error bit probability, however, depends on the
disturbance factor D in the quantum channel, pe = D.
QBER is thus given as [13]
QSARG04 =
D
1
2
+D
=
1− V
2− V
. (3)
The total sifted key rates Rµ for the weak-pulse BB84
and the SARG04 protocols are given as [15]
RBB84µ =
1
2
(1− p2de
−µη), (4)
RSARG04µ =
1
2
(1 +
pd
2
e−µFη −
pd
2
e−µDη − p2de
−µη),(5)
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FIG. 1. Schematic of experimental setup. See text for details.
for the average photon number per pulse µ and for a
quantum channel characterized with the transmission
factor t = 10−αl/10 where α is the attenuation coeffi-
cient (dB/km) and l is the length of the channel. Also,
pd = 1 − pd where pd is the dark count probability and
η = ηdt where ηd is Bob’s detection efficiency. Note that
Rµ =
∑
nRn =
∑
n Yne
−µµn/n! where Yn is the proba-
bility for Bob to have a conclusive result for the n-photon
pulse sent from Alice. It is interesting to point out that
the sifting rate for BB84 is independent of the channel
visibility V while that of SARG04 varies with V . This is
due to the fact that, for BB84, pe+ pc = F +D = 1, but
for SARG04, pe + pc = 1/2 +D.
The secure key rates (the lower bound) in the presence
of depolarization in the quantum channel can then be de-
termined with the total sifting rates Rµ and the average
QBER Qµ ≡
∑
nQnRn/Rµ (Qn denotes the QBER for
the n-photon pulse) using experimental obtained param-
eters [15].
To experimentally test the effects of depolarization in
the quantum channel on the performance of weak-pulse
BB84 and SARG04 quantum cryptography protocols, we
have built a fiber-based quantum cryptography system
schematically shown in Fig. 1. Alice’s setup consists of a
diode laser which emits a train of 3 ns long 780 nm laser
pulses at 1 MHz repetition rate, two Pockels cells for po-
larization encoding, and FPGA-based electronics for con-
trolling and storing the data. Polarization-encoded laser
pulses are then attenuated with a neutral density (ND)
filter set and coupled into a fiber beamsplitter (FBS). A
single-photon detector connected to one end of FBS is
used to measure the average photon number per pulse so
that µ < 1 and the other end of FBS is connected to the
quantum channel, a 1.27 km long single-mode fiber spool.
The attenuation coefficient of the fiber at 780 nm is α = 3
dB/km and the initial channel visibility of the fiber quan-
tum channel is measured to be Vi = 0.954± 0.002. Bob’s
setup consists of a 3nm bandpass filter (IF), a 50/50
beam splitter for random selecting between Z-basis (|H〉
and |V 〉) and X-basis (|45◦〉 and | − 45◦〉), four Si single-
photon detectors and a counter/timer card for data stor-
age. Bob’s detection efficiency (including optics and the
detector) and the dark count probability are measured to
be ηd = 0.4 and pd = 3.3± 0.6× 10
−5, respectively.
Since depolarization in the quantum channel is related
to the channel visibility as D = (1 − V )/2, it is nec-
essary to vary the channel visibility V to observe the
effect of depolarizing quantum channels on BB84 and
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FIG. 2. QBER vs. channel visibility. The solid lines are
due to eq. (2) and eq. (3). Experiments are done for µ =
0.189 ± 0.001
SARG04 protocols. Rather than actually introducing ad-
ditional fiber-based polarization controllers to the setup
to decrease the channel visibility from the initial value
Vi = 0.954, we use the effective method described as fol-
lows. Note that the effect of quantum channel depolar-
ization is to flip the qubit |Ψ〉 to the orthogonal one |Ψ⊥〉
with the probability D. Thus, to effectively implement
channel depolarization, we simply flip the stored bit in-
formation at Alice with probability D determined by the
desired channel visibility value. For example, to achieve
the effect of channel visibility of 0.9, 5% of Alice’s stored
bits are randomly selected and flipped. Note that, in this
case, since the initial channel visibility is 0.954, we are in
fact achieving the channel visibility of 0.859.
Figure 2 shows QBER as a function of channel visibil-
ity for the BB84 and the SARG04 protocols in the case
of average photon number per pulse µ = 0.189. The ex-
perimental results shown in Fig. 2 agree well with eq. (2)
and eq. (3). We have repeated the QBER vs. channel
visibility measurement for various values of the average
photon number per pulse, µ ≈ 0.03 ∼ 0.30, and they
show the same results as in Fig. 2. The SARG04 pro-
tocol, therefore, is shown to be more sensitive than the
BB84 protocol for the depolarization effect in the quan-
tum channel.
We have also tested how the sifted key rates are af-
fected by the depolarizing effect in the quantum channel.
The experimental results shown in Fig. 3 reveal that the
sifted key rate for the BB84 is independent on the channel
visibility, but the SARG04 protocol exhibits channel vis-
ibility dependent sifted key rates. It is also worth while
to mention that, as evident from Fig. 3, the BB84 proto-
col always generates more sifted keys than the SARG04
protocol. Note that Fig. 3 shows small discrepancies be-
tween the experimental results and the theoretical results
due to eq. (4) and eq. (5). These discrepancies suggest
that there are slight systematic errors in estimating the
average photon number per pulse µ, the detection effi-
ciencies, and the dark counts. These errors, however,
are small enough so that they do not affect the secure
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FIG. 3. Sifted key generating rate vs. quantum channel visi-
bility. The solid lines are due to eq. (4) and eq. (5). Experi-
ments are done for µ = 0.189 ± 0.001
key generation rates (the lower bound) significantly, see
Fig. 4.
Although the sifted key rates for the BB84 and the
SARG04 protocols behave differently in the presence of
depolarization in the quantum channel, the overall error
rates RµQµ are shown to be the same for a given channel
visibility [15],
RBB84µ Q
BB84
µ = R
SARG04
µ Q
SARG04
µ
=
1
4
(1 + pde
−µFη − pde
−µDη − p2de
−µη). (6)
We have calculated the overall error bit rates RµQµ for a
variety of values of the quantum channel visibility using
the data shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 and found that the
above relation holds. The overall error rate is shown to
decrease linearly as the visibility of the quantum channel
is increased.
Finally, we study the secure key generation rates (the
lower bound) for the BB84 and the SARG04 protocols
in the presence of depolarization in the quantum chan-
nel. As mentioned earlier, the secure key rates are cal-
culated from the experimentally obtained QBER, sifted
key rates, and parameters of the experimental setup [15].
Figure 4 shows the the secure key generation rates (the
lower bound) for the two protocols as a function of the
channel visibility. Note that each data point in Fig. 4
corresponds the maximum value of the secure key rates
(the lower bound) for the range of values of the average
photon number per pulse, 0.03 ≤ µ ≤ 0.30, for a given
channel visibility. In other words, each data point in
Fig. 4 is obtained with the optimum value of µ. We also
note that the optimum value of µ is shown to decrease
monotonically (for BB84, from µ = 0.189 to µ = 0.060;
for SARG04, from µ = 0.189 to µ = 0.033) as the quan-
tum channel visibility is reduced.
The experimental results in Fig. 4 show that, although
the SARG04 protocol has been known to be more robust
against the PNS attack than the BB84 protocol, the lat-
ter performs better in real-world conditions, i.e., limited
detection efficiency, non-zero dark count probability, and,
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FIG. 4. Secure key generation rate (the lower bound) vs.
channel visibility. The BB84 protocol is shown to generate
more secure keys than the SARG04 protocol in the presence
of depolarization in the quantum channel. The solid lines
are theoretical plots due to the results in Ref. 15 using the
parameters of the experimental setup.
most importantly, the quantum channel subject to depo-
larization effects.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated experimentally
the effect of depolarization in the quantum channel
on weak-pulse BB84 and SARG04 quantum cryptogra-
phy protocols. The experimental results show that the
SARG04 protocol is more susceptible to the depolariza-
tion effect in the quantum channel than the BB84 pro-
tocol. In real-world quantum cryptography applications
in which the quantum channel cannot be assumed to be
perfect, therefore, the BB84 protocol appears to provide
better performance than the SARG04 protocol.
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